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LEARNING IS NOT CHILD’S PLAY:
        ASSESSING THE 
                NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
Gwendolyn J. Dean
Dr. Barbara Patrick, Mentor
ABSTRACT
This research examines the implementation and impact 
of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) on education 
quality. More specifically, it outlines how states defined NCLB 
provisions, including trajectory selection, reporting techniques, 
confidence interval use, and methods used to inform the public of 
outcomes. It also discusses NCLB’s impact on education outcomes 
by assessing changes in fourth grade reading scores under NCLB. 
This qualitative study includes several demographic variables 
that will allow the study to control for the impact that NCLB’s 
implementations has caused and its effect on school districts that 
have taken on this process. 
Keywords: performance reporting, sanctions, data manipulation, 
NCLB provisions, vulnerable populations, transparency
INTRODUCTION
Questions about the quality of education provided by 
public school systems have raised concerns and led to federal 
reforms such as the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). 
NCLB legislation required all 50 states to ensure that 100% of 
public school students were proficient in reading and math within 
a designated time frame. This goal placed a significant amount 
of responsibility on teachers, administrators, and the individual 
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school districts for any and all academic achievements and failures 
of their students (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). The failure 
to meet performance targets and goals had several important 
results: schools could suffer a loss of funding and be publicly 
criticized because their performance results were published; 
students were given the opportunity to attend a higher performing 
school, and teachers thus experienced a loss of job security. These 
sanctions were to be implemented over the course of a five-year 
timeline if the school failed to perform at expected levels (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2006). 
Though NCLB aimed to improve the quality of education 
that many racial minorities and low-income students receive, many 
questions remain about how NCLB was implemented and whether 
or not it has achieved its goals. Stiefel, Schwartz, and Chellman 
(2007) argued that NCLB has had both a positive and negative effect 
on education. Studies show that the stronger accountability system 
tends to result in gains in the test scores of African American and 
Hispanic students in both the fourth and eighth grade; however, 
school segregation still plays a role in determining whether the 
racial test score gap can be reduced, since many schools are still 
segregated today (Stiefel et al., 2007). 
Patrick (2013) pointed out that states have used different 
methods to implement NCLB. For example, some states have found 
loopholes in the legislation, allowing them to bypass federal rules 
and regulations. One such example is the way the public is granted 
access to performance data about local schools. Some states use the 
Internet as their primary means of releasing performance results 
to parents and the general public. Low-income parents who do not 
have access to the Internet may not receive performance results 
about their child’s school. Other examples include employing a 
less visible form of print media to inform the public of test results 
or using a 75% confidence interval to manipulate the way test 
scores are calculated.   Though Patrick’s (2013) work highlights 
some of the ways states manipulated the implementation of federal 
NCLB legislation, there are many other important provisions and 
elements of NCLB that are not commonly discussed. 
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This paper will build on Patrick’s (2013) work by further 
highlighting NCLB elements that were manipulated by some 
states, thus providing a more holistic view of the NCLB Act. This 
research will assess whether or not performance management 
advocates’ assumptions that the use of performance reforms in the 
public sector will improve the quality of services citizens actually 
receive, and it will address the quality of performance systems 
developed under federally-mandated reforms by asking, “have 
states developed meaningful performance accountability systems 
under the NCLB Act?”  
Concerns About the Quality of Education
Both policymakers and citizens have expressed concerns 
about the quality of the public education system. These concerns 
are particularly notable in districts that serve low-income and 
underrepresented students. Cooper (2005) wrote that low-income 
Latino and African American mothers in urban areas felt that public 
educators “did not care about their children” and, therefore, did not 
provide them with a high-quality education. Archbald (2004) and 
Saporito (2003) produced work that supported Cooper’s finding by 
stating that low-income or high-poverty parents wanted to choose 
where their children attend school, so that they might receive a better 
education. Other researchers demonstrated that public education 
reforms have begun to address parents’ and citizens’ concerns by 
shifting from the development of policies that viewed poor families 
and minority students as a “problem to which schools provide a 
solution” to a system in which teachers and administrators are viewed 
as the “problem” (Little & Bartlett, 2010; Patrick, 2013). Federal 
legislation such as the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act has promoted 
this shift in perspective.
No Child Left Behind
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was created to 
help school districts efficiently and effectively improve academic 
achievement and meet performance goals. The legislation was 
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implemented in public school districts to ensure that states 
were doing their job in educating their students in such a way 
that the students actually learned the material. This goal would 
be accomplished by developing specific guidelines that outlined 
how states would execute their reforms. These reforms included 
the requirement that school districts demonstrate adequate yearly 
progress (AYP), which determined how school districts planned 
on meeting their yearly goals, the funding that school districts 
used in case of failure to meet those goals, and other state and local 
education policies (U.S. Department of Education, 2006).
The NCLB Act focused on improving the quality of 
education in school districts and gathered data through the 
testing of elementary and secondary school students in the subject 
areas of reading and mathematics (U.S. Department of Education, 
2006). One of the biggest concerns at both the state and local levels 
of education is the test-taking abilities of the target population 
(Cooper, 2003). Historically, African American and Latino low-
income students’ test scores have lagged behind those of their more 
affluent White counterparts (Stiefel et al., 2007).  In order to address 
this, NCLB legislation required states to segregate low-achieving 
groups of students into isolated subgroups and to report their test 
scores separately.  Schools had to ensure that 100% of students in 
these subgroups tested “proficient” or higher in both reading and 
mathematics by the end of the 2013–14 school year (Saporito, 
2003).  Although this goal placed underrepresented students who 
have been traditionally left behind by the public school system at the 
forefront of the education reform agenda, this subgroup remains of 
great concern throughout the nation because of its lack of resources 
(Stiefel et al., 2007).
Over the years, school districts were evaluated to ensure 
that they reached their AYP within the time frame used to 
determine their eligibility to receive federal funding (Porter, Linn, 
& Trimble, 2005). The threat of lost funding served as motivation 
for districts to improve their test scores, particularly in African 
American and Latino student populations (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2006).
With the addition of incentives, teachers gained an 
additional opportunity to improve the quality of their teaching 
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(Patrick, 2013). The focus was placed on creating improvements in 
three specific groups: rural teachers, science teachers, and current 
multi-subject teachers (Muller & Schiller, 2000). Almost 5,000 
school districts in the United States are considered rural; in most 
cases, teachers instruct more than one subject for which they have 
not received adequate training (Carnoy, Loeb, & Smith, 2001). 
Under the new incentives for rural teachers, teachers would have 
an additional three years to become qualified in the additional 
subjects they teach (Muller & Schiller, 2000). 
Along with the incentives in professional development, 
intense supervision and structured mentoring were recommended 
(U.S Department of Education, 2006). In addressing multi-
subject teachers, the guidelines allowed states to streamline the 
evaluation process by developing a method for these teachers to 
demonstrate that they are highly qualified in each of their subjects 
and could maintain the same high standards in subject matter 
mastery (Stiefel et al., 2007). Science teachers could also prove 
they were highly qualified; some states determined, based on their 
current certification requirements, how science teachers would 
demonstrate their qualifications in either a “broad field” science or 
individual fields such as physics, biology, etc. (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2006).
Trajectories
The U.S. Department of Education outlined four types of 
trajectories, or timelines, used to record and map AYP progress 
over a 12-year span (Patrick, 2013). The four trajectory models 
included straight-line, stair-step pattern, front-load, and back 
load. Initially recommended by the U.S. Department of Education, 
the straight-line trajectory established equal incremental increases 
in performance that would ultimately lead to the targeted 100% 
proficiency goal. Therefore, if half of the eighth grade students 
demonstrated proficiency in a specific subject at the start of 
2002, that state would have to increase the annual measurable 
objective by 4% each year in order to reach the 100% proficiency 
goal by 2014 (Porter et al., 2005). A stair-step pattern trajectory 
provided the first increase in performance in either 2004 or 2005, 
with succeeding increases every second or third year (Patrick, 
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2013). Given this additional two to three-year time span, states 
had more time to avoid public criticism and sanctions if the state 
was determined to be underachieving (Patrick, 2013). Front-
load trajectories required significant increases early in the NCLB 
process, with smaller increases in the following years (Patrick, 
2013). Frontline states experienced immeasurable pressures in the 
beginning of the implementation process in comparison to back-
load trajectories, which measured performance closer to the 2014 
deadline (Patrick, 2013). Once President Bush left office, most 
back-loaded states set their accountability target for the 2007–
2008 school term (Porter et al., 2005).
Confidence Intervals
 Confidence intervals allow the statistical manipulation of 
overall and subgroup scores so that schools can more accurately meet 
AYP requirements (Patrick, 2013). Without the implementation of 
confidence intervals, states would fail to produce their outcomes 
(Porter et al., 2005). For example, if 45% of the students in a 
specific subgroup proved proficient or above in math, and the year’s 
objective was 50% or more proficient, the school would meet still 
meet the AYP requirement if the confidence interval had a width of 
12 percentage points (+45 or -6) (Patrick, 2013). 
 Without the use of different trajectories, subgroup requirements, 
and confidence intervals, many schools across the country that have met 
AYP requirements would not have been able to do so (Porter et al., 2005). 
This conclusion offers insight on the usefulness of performance reforms 
that affect the lives of millions of Americans, especially those individuals 
who come from low-income and underrepresented communities, who 
greatly depend on government educational services (Patrick, 2013). 
Table 1. shows detailed data on which states implemented the use of 
trajectory selection as well as a 75% confidence interval to achieve AYP 
and performance goals. 
Sanctions
NCLB has created a timeline of consequences for those 
districts that do not achieve AYP. The law requires school 
districts to use annual tests to demonstrate that their students 
have reached 100% academic proficiency (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002).
Gwendolyn J. Dean
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Alabama 0 1
Alaska 0 0
Arizona 0 0
Arkansas 1 0
California 0 0
Colorado 1 1
Connecticut 1 0
Delaware 0 1
Florida 1 1
Georgia 0 1
Hawaii 0 1
Idaho 1 1
Illinois 1 0
Indiana 0 0
Iowa 0 1
Kansas 0 0
Kentucky 0 1
Louisiana 0 1
Maine 0 1
Maryland 1 1
Massachusetts 1 1
Michigan 0 1
Minnesota 1 1
Mississippi 1 1
Missouri 1 0
Montana 1 0
Nebraska 1 0
Learning Is Not Child’s Play :
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Table 1. Data Assessment Index (Patrick, 2013). (Continued on next psge).
STATE Trajectory Selection, 
no.1 = incremental)
75% confidence i
nterval, 
no.1= do not use)
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Nevada 0 0
New Hampshire 1 0
New Jersey 1 0
New Mexico 1 1
New York 1 1
North Carolina 1 1
North Dakota 1 1
Ohio 0 1
Oklahoma 0 0
Oregon 0 1
Pennsylvania 0 0
Rhode Island 0 1
South Carolina 1 1
South Dakota 0 0
Tennessee 1 1
Texas 1 1
Utah 1 0
Vermont 1 1
Virginia 1 1
Washington 1 1
West Virginia 0 1
Wisconsin 0 0
Wyoming 0 0
It is expected that school districts will close the academic gap 
between economically advantaged students and students of 
different economic, racial, and ethnic backgrounds.
Gwendolyn J. Dean
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Table 1. Data Assessment Index (Patrick, 2013). (Continued from previous psge).
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No Child Left Behind requires failing districts to develop 
a Six-Year Plan (Table 2.), (Porter et al., 2005). The first year a 
district misses AYP, the district is granted a probationary year. The 
second consecutive year a district misses AYP is described as the 
“First School Year Improvement” and provides parents with the 
opportunity to transfer their child to a school in the district that has 
stronger test scores, at no cost. This sanction is designed to apply 
market pressure to public schools that are classified as “failing”; 
either the school will improve student performance and meet 
performance goals, or it will lose enrollment and subsequently 
receive decreased operational funding. 
During the third year, technical assistance is provided to 
the schools, and the district must make public school choice and 
supplemental educational services available to the students. This 
round of sanctions also has financial implications for the failing 
school. If it continues to fail to meet performance expectations, 
it must provide the students remaining in the school district with 
the option to seek supplemental help through an outside service 
at a cost to the district.
The fourth consecutive year missing AYP, in addition to 
the above, the school is identified for corrective action, as well 
as facing further actions. After the fifth year missing AYP, a plan 
must be prepared for the restructuring of the school. After the 
final, sixth year, the school may be reopened as a public charter 
school, with the replacement of some or all of the teachers.
PROBLEMS
One of the biggest issues in American education is the 
resistance to improve the education system (Carnoy et al., 2001). 
Some argue that testing used to “improve” schools and student 
learning does not promote real academic improvement (Carnoy 
et al., 2001). Facing such sanctions, teachers “teach the test” rather 
than subject content (Patrick, 2013). Some argue that NCLB does 
not focus on the learning environment and reduces the students’ 
opportunities to develop higher-order skills (Stiefel et al., 2007). 
Others argue that state issued tests will increase the dropout rate 
in disadvantaged student populations (Muller & Schiller, 2000).
Learning Is Not Child’s Play :
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Consecutive years 
of missing AYP
Sanctions
First Year • Placed on “watch list.”
• Required to develop a school improvement plan.
Second Year • Listed as “needs improvement school.”
• District must provide students attending the “needs improvement 
school” the option of attending another school that has met 
annual yearly progress. District pays transportation costs. 
Third Year • Listed as “needs improvement school.”
• District must provide students the option of attending another 
school that has met annual yearly progress. District pays 
transportation costs. 
• District must offer “supplemental educational services” to any 
student who qualifies for free or reduced lunch. Option of 
supplemental services from an outside provider.
Fourth Year • Listed as “needs improvement school.”
• District must provide students attending the “needs improvement 
school” the option of attending another school that has met 
annual yearly progress. The district pays transportation costs. 
• The school district must offer “supplemental educational services” to 
any student who qualifies for free or reduced lunch. One option for 
supplemental services must be from an outside provider.
• The school must change its staffing or make a “fundamental 
change” such as restructuring the school.
Fifth Year • Listed as “needs improvement school.”
• District must provide students attending the “needs improvement 
school” the option of attending another school that has met 
annual yearly progress. The district pays transportation costs. 
• The school district must offer “supplemental educational services” to 
any student who qualifies for free or reduced lunch. One option for 
supplemental services must be from an outside provider.
• The school must convert into a charter school, turn management over to 
a private management company, or be taken over by the state.
Gwendolyn J. Dean
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State accountability and assessment have not always been 
related. Assessments were mainly used to divide students into 
“academic tracks” or for diagnostic purposes, to determine whether 
student achievement matched state curricula (Stiefel et al., 2007). 
Typically, academic progress was considered the responsibility of the 
community and the home (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). 
Two main concepts, “alignment” and “capacity building,” underlie 
the standard-based reforms, which define systems of instruction, 
assessment, grading, and academic reporting (Chatterji, 2002). 
“Alignment” refers to the school setting clear standards and aligning 
curriculum and accountability mechanisms with those standards, 
before focusing on improving the outcomes. “Capacity building” is 
intended to improve the capacity of teachers and administrators to 
deliver better education (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002).
Implementation and Sanctioning Problems
 Other problems have been found in the way NCLB 
policies were developed and implemented. The states were given 
some control over how they implemented the details of the federal 
legislation, but the teachers who worked closely with the students 
and understood their needs were sometimes removed from the 
process (Porter et al., 2005). This created an environment in which 
educators saw their job security tied to students’ performance on 
standardized exams (Patrick, 2013). This, in turn, created problems 
in future teacher recruitment.
 Subgroup reporting requires school districts to provide 
evidence that proficiency goals are being met both in the overall 
student population as well as in vulnerable subgroups. These groups 
include racial and ethnic minorities, economically disadvantaged 
students, those with disabilities, and students that speak a limited 
amount of English (Patrick, 2013). If a school in any district 
fails to document that these students are meeting performance 
goals and making progress towards reaching 100% proficiency, 
that school will then be labeled as “failing” (Patrick, 2013). It is 
known that students in these subgroups have historically failed 
on standardized exams; it is therefore challenging for educators to 
meet 100% proficiency and performance goals.
Learning Is Not Child’s Play :
Assessing the No Child Left Behind Act
11
Dean: Learning is Not Child's Play
Published by DigitalCommons@EMU,
44
 NCLB did not define who would measure and report the 
test scores for underrepresented minority subgroups. States had the 
freedom to determine the lowest mandatory number of enrolled 
minority students before the school was required to single out the
Minimum Number of Enrolled Minority 
Students to Require Subgroup
Number of States Using this Minimum 
to Determine Need for Subgroup
100 1
60 1
52 1
50 3
45 2
42 1
40 14
34 1
30 13
25 2
20 4
11 1
10 3
5 1
None 2
Gwendolyn J. Dean
State NEAP Test Results State Test Results Difference
Arkansas 34% 34% 0%
Arizona 27.9% 63% -35.1%
California 28% 50.8% -22.8%
Colorado 38.8% 74% -35.2%
Delaware 36.1% 52.8% -16.7%
Florida 36.6% 59% -22.4%
Georgia 29.5% 68.8% -39.3%
Table 3. Minimum Number of Underrepresented Students Tested in a School for 
Subgroup Accountability (Porter et al., 2005).
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Hawaii 26.7% 20.2% 6.5%
Idaho 40.4% 68.7% -28.3%
Illinois 31.6% 54.3% -22.7%
Indiana 38.2% 72% -33.8%
Kentucky 26.1% 36% -9.9%
Louisiana 23.9% 55.2% -31.3%
Maine 38.8% 29% 9.8%
Maryland 38% 51.7% -13.7%
Massachusetts 48.8% 39% 9.8%
Michigan 37.7% 62% -24.3%
Mississippi 19.4% 55% -35.6%
Missouri 31.1% 15.5% 15.6%
Montana 38.3% 62.4% -24.1%
Nebraska 36.1% 81.8% -45.7%
Nevada 26.1% 49% -22.9%
New Jersey 45.4% 62.4% -17%
New York 36.1% 55% -18.9%
North Carolina 39.9% 84% -44.1%
North Dakota 40.4% 65.3% -24.9%
Ohio 42.5% 60.1% -17.6%
Oregon 37% 63.5% -26.5%
Pennsylvania 41.5% 62.9% -21.4%
South Carolina 35.9% 23.2% 12.7%
Tennessee 27.7% 87.2% -59.5%
Texas 40% 61% -21%
Virginia 39.3% 80% -40.7%
West Virginia 25.1% 70.6% -45.5%
Wisconsin 40.3% 73% -32.7%
Wyoming 42.6% 38% 4.6%
Table 4: 2005 NAEP Test v. 2005 State Test Scores in Eighth Grade Math Proficiency (School 
Matters: A Service of Standards and Poors, (2006), National Education Data Partnership, 
2006 National Conference Education Statistics).
State NEAP Test Results State Test Results Difference
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minority student test scores and report them (Porter et al., 2005). 
A Rural School and Community Trust Report encouraged states 
to set a high minority enrollment requirement to decrease the 
number of schools required to separate minority test scores from 
the scores of the total student body. By setting the number high, 
some rural schools were able to avoid reporting separate scores for 
their minority students; thus, teachers were not held accountable for 
addressing the needs of this population (Carnoy et al., 2001). Table 
3. provides data on the number of states that have implemented a 
minimum number of underrepresented students that were tested in 
a school for subgroup accountability.
 The third, and perhaps the most damaging problem, concerned 
changes in educational quality. NCLB granted states the freedom to 
create their own examinations to measure student performance. These 
exams varied in quality and content. Table 4. highlights the differences 
in test scores between state-developed tests and the National Assessment 
of Education Progress (NAEP) examination. The spread between the 
state and national exams is telling: for example, Tennessee experienced 
a 59.5% difference between the state and national test scores. Similarly, 
North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia all reported more than a 
40% difference in student test scores between the state and national 
examinations. Such differences raise concerns about the reliability of 
state-developed testing.
CONCLUSION
 Despite its intention to improve the quality of education in 
American public schools, the NCLB Act of 2001 resulted in a number 
of problems, negative changes, and uncertainty about the future. 
In addition to doing little to assist poorly performing districts and 
creating great anxiety through the challenge of reaching adequate 
yearly progress and performance goals, the use of confidence intervals 
and trajectory selections have provided little evidence that districts are 
indeed offering the students most at risk better opportunities to learn. 
Placing the responsibility of implementing NCLB on the states has 
proven unsuccessful in bringing the standards of public education to a 
level equal to the needs of the American people. 
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